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ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the use of monetary incentives to increase the supply of

cadaver organs. The research focuses on whether a waiver of a driver's license fee can
increase the proportion of society declaring to be a cadaver organ donor . In addition, the
dynamics of organ donation are addressed using a bivariate regression to test if being a
college student, religion, age , gender, income , and overall knowledge of donation has a
significant impact on whether one chooses to be cadaver organ donor. Finally, the concern
that a monetary and altruistic market can coexist is addressed in this research. Utilizing
sample Z-statistics, it is found that a small incentive has the potential to significantly impact
the number of cadaver organ donors. A significant finding is that students are more likely to
become cadaver organ donors when offered the $30 fee waiver , whereas religion , gender,
and income do not statistically impact ones decision .
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I.

Introduction

On average, 21 people die every day awaiting an organ transplant (organdonor.org). In
the context of economics, this phenomenon is a shortage, and in the world of the affected, it
is the difference between life, misery, and death. Since the passage of the National Organ
Transplant Act (NOTA), which prohibits the sale of organs for human transplantation,
economists, philosophers, public policy experts, religious leaders, and others have debated
the ethical and effective standing of this law.
Increasing the supply of cadaver organ 1 donors could help to fill some of this
shortage. Recently it has been proposed that the supply of cadaver organs could be
increased by introducing monetary incentives to potential cadaver organ donors. This
concept has met resistance on both ethical and empirical grounds. Referencing ethics, the
use of incentives has been criticized for potentially victimizing the poor, advancing the black
market, and depleting altruism within society. Although this research offers an empirical
analysis regarding the effectiveness of a $30 incentive, this paper recognizes and
addresses the importance of an ethical debate.
The empirical debate surrounding the use of incentives has faced unique challenges
due to the inadequacy of data. With the exception of Iran, China, and India, monetary
payments for organs are illegal, leading to a predominantly theoretical dialogue. This paper
examines the impact of a small monetary incentive in an effort to increase the number of
cadaver organ donors. The format for this paper is as follows: Section II provides a
literature review on previous endeavors regarding the use of incentives to increase organ
supply, Section III elaborates on the theoretical model utilized in the research, Section IV
describes the data, Section V utilizes Z-test statistics to test the significance of the $30
1

Living Organ Donors donate their organs while they are still alive. They undergo a procedure to have their organs
removed for transplantation. Cadaver Organ Donors donate their organs after their death. Their organs are removed
within 24 to 48 hours after their death and then transplanted.
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incentive in inducing a change in the number of cadaver organ donors. Section VI explores
the impact of the fee waiver in the context of different demographic groups by utilizing
binary logistic regressions, while Section VII deliberates ethical considerations. Section VIII
concludes with policy ramifications and avenues for future research.
II.

Literature Review

A. Titmuss and Arrow

The debate surrounding the use of incentives to increase the supply of organs has
remained in the theoretical realm. Richard Titmuss (1971) was the first to entertain the
notion of offering monetary compensation for human tissue, arguing that monetary
incentives for organs could cause market failure. He saw monetary compensation as a
health risk due to the inclination of unhealthy individuals to partake in the market. As
Titmuss contested, "One might infer that, in the absence of effective tests for diseases like
hepatitis, donated blood is of better quality because donors who are not paid for their blood
have no incentive to conceal their illnesses" (Thorne, 2006, p. 1,342). In other words,
offering incentives degrades the quality of blood since unhealthy individuals, who before
were not enticed to donate out of altruism, now maintain a monetary incentive to partake in
the market.
Furthermore, Titmuss feared incentives for human tissue would deplete altruistic
donation, believing an altruistic and monetary market could not coexist (Titmuss, 1971).
This axiom was founded on Titmuss's assertion that monetary markets denied individuals
"the right to give" (1971).
Arrow disagreed with Titmuss when he stated "Why should it be that the creation of
a market in blood would decrease the altruism embodied in giving blood? I do not find any
clear answers in Titmuss'" (Arrow, 1972, p.350). It can be inferred that Arrow believes that
4

altruistic and non-altruistic suppliers are motivated by different incentives, and that altruistic
donors respond to exhortation while non-altruistic individuals respond to monetary
incentives. Since the two suppliers respond to distinct motivators, neither subset is
impacted by the introduction of the alternative.
Extended studies have investigated the debate between Arrow and Titmuss. Leider
and Roth (2010) examined Americans' approval of a monetary market for organs. They
concluded a majority of Americans approve of a kidney market, especially when it is
regulated by a third party, in this case the government.
B. Case Studies

There are few reliable studies which offer insight into compensating organ donors.
Ashkenazi, Stoler, Cohen, and Beyar (2013) investigated The Brain-Respiratory Death Law
and The Organ Transplantation Law, studying their impact on organ donation in Israel.
Essentially, the law works to remove disincentives which are encountered by living donors;
(a) earning loss reimbursement of 40 days based on the donor's average income during the
three months prior to donation, (b) a fixed transportation refund to cover commuting costs,
(c) reimbursement for seven days during recovery, (d) five years reimbursement of medical,
work capability loss and insurances, (e) reimbursement of five psychological consultations
and treatments.
The removal of the disincentives is credited with increasing the supply of organs in
the State. "Compared to previous years, in 2011 there was a significant increase in the
number of deceased organ donors directly related to an increase in organ donation rate
(from 7.8 to 11 .4 donors per million population), in parallel to a significant increase in the
number of new registered donors" (Lavee, 2013, p. 780) . While the aforementioned are a
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removal of disincentives, the implementation of incentives is a similar, if not identical,
concept.
In conjunction with Israel, a pseudo-incentivized program has been utilized in the
state of Georgia. Until recently, the state of Georgia offered a $7 discount on driver's license
registration fees to individuals who registered as organ donors. The discount was scrapped
in 2005 as part of an overhaul of the driver's license registration system. Prior to this
change Georgia had one of the highest registration rates for organ donation in the country
(Howard, 2007). Though dangerous to assume cause and effect, the program provides
contextual support that a relatively small monetary payment could increase the number of
cadaver organ donors.
C. Socio-demographics

A substantial argument against the use of incentives is the concern of victimizing the
poor. According to Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "the movement and flow of living donor organs
-mostly kidneys- is from South to North, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white,
and from female to male bodies" (Satel, 2008 , p. 59) . Furthermore, a journalist for the
Washington Post declared "compensation for organs might exacerbate the differences
[between rich and poor] turning the poor into surgical ward slaves or feudal donors for the
rich" (Satel, 2008, p. 59) . These concerns both relate to living donations while this study
seeks to investigate the use of a monetary incentive to increase the number of cadaver
organ donors.
In addition to socioeconomic status, Satel (2008) investigated different religious
groups' tolerance towards compensating organ donors, focusing on Judaism, Islam, and
Catholicism. Satel (2008) concludes that Judaism is the most receptive to a market for
organs with Catholicism the most resistant. Regarding Islam, Satel acknowledges the
6

complexity within the religion noting most scholars condemn the sale of organs due to the
acceptance that Allah owns the body; humans are not granted the right to sell organs they
do not possess. However, Satel uncovered that a majority of Islamic scholars approve of
such transactions, if faced with death (Satel, 2008).
Although individual leaders and scholars within the religion have attempted to
humanize the monetary market for organs, the overall temperance of the Catholic Church
towards a market-based system is negative.
"The Catholic consensus position endorses Pope John Paul II's
opposition to the commercialization of human organs. The United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a directive asserting that
living donor transplantation is acceptable, 'but economic advantages
should not accrue to the donor.' The National Catholic Bioethics Center
has stated the position even more forcefully, saying it 'strongly opposes
any regulated market for organ sales'" (Satel, 2008, p. 162).
D. Recent Endeavors

Further research has been done investigating if monetary incentives can be utilized
to increase the supply of living organ donors. Becker and Elias (2007) found that monetary
incentives could increase the supply of organs for transplant sufficiently to eliminate the
large queues in the organ market, and it would do so while increasing the overall cost of
transplant surgery by no more than 12%. In estimating the cost of living kidneys and livers
they found that an average cost for a kidney and liver transplantation was $160,000 and
$335,000 respectively. However, these studies utilized international comparisons from
countries that have different political stances on organ donation. For instance, the Iranian
government has outlawed monetary compensation for cadaver organs on the grounds that it
violates the Koran. Although an admirable attempt, utilizing estimates and international
comparisons to compute an equilibrium price for living organs subjects the researcher to
cultural variation in the data.
7

Adams (1999) investigated monetary incentives for organ donation in the United
States gathering data from 392 students at Auburn University. Students were asked at
what price they would be willing to sell their organs finding the market clearing price for
kidneys and livers to be $1,000. However, a bias exists in the research because the
surveyed sample is not an accurate representation of the population. Despite the empirical
obstacles, Thorne (2006) acknowledges a vast majority of economists recognize the
absence of an organ market has led to a quantity shortage.
E. Cadaver Organ Donation

The previous works investigated incentives to increase living organ donation. This
research investigates how to increase cadaver organ donation. Thaler (2008) argued how a
more competent donation system could increase the number of donors in the United States,
arguing for an "opt-out" system contrary to an "opt-in." The reason for this change is that
Thaler (2008) believes individual states could increase the quantity of organs using Kurtz
and Saks (1996) finding that;
"Ninety-Seven percent of respondents indicated their general support for
transplantation. Of those who expressed their support, only 43% had the
box checked on their driver's license. Of those who stated they personally
wanted to donate their organs only 64% had marked their driver's license
and only 36% had signed an organ donor card."
This finding allows Thaler (2008) to conclude that the concrete steps necessary to
register as an organ donor deter otherwise willing donors from registering. Recognizing the
importance of the default, replacing an "opt-in" with an "opt-out" could have a dramatic
impact. Despite its usefulness, Thaler (2008) recognizes the improbability of crafting a
presumed consent, politically. His takeaway is that recognizing the "incentive" needed to
entice organ donation is relatively small. For instance, switching from an "opt-in" vs. "opt-
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out", all else equal, a state could experience an increase in donation by 16%. This
suggests alternate incentives could have just as, if not a more powerful impact. With this
finding in mind this research examines if waiving a $30 driver license fee in the state of
Illinois could entice individuals to register to become cadaver organ donors.
III.

Theory

The theoretical construct for this research is based on the neoclassical supply and
demand framework. This framework theorizes that an increase in the price of an organ
results in an increase in the quantity supplied. The model maintains the following
assumptions: (a) the quality of the organs will be the same whether sold or donated, (b)
altruistic donors will continue to supply even after a market is introduced2, (c) when markets
are banned, not only is the cost of the good zero, but no other costs are required to procure
the donated good, (d) nothing can be done to increase the supply of organs when markets
are banned (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1989).
These assumptions have received criticism, specifically regarding the assertion that
altruistic donations will exist after the introduction of monetary incentives and that the quality
remains constant. As Titmuss (1971) expressed, the quality of the good may deteriorate in
the market, since individuals now have an incentive to hide deficiencies. Second, the model
assumes costs do not exist with altruistic donations. The model also treats individuals on a
dichotomous scale; either as altruistic or non-altruistic. There is reason to believe the
introduction of monetary incentives might turn altruistic donors into monetary enticed
individuals. Even though the overall number of cadaver organs might increase, the quantity
of altruistic donors could wither.

2 Note: This directly contradicts Titmuss
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Using this framework the research investigates if waiving a $30 driver's license fee
can increase the supply of cadaver organ donors. Although this is a similar concept to a
payment of schedules, the incentivized program is unique. First, respondents are trading a
future commodity, which entails uncertainty in the transaction.3 Second, unlike the payment
of schedules system utilized by Adams (1999), the incentive program is a take it or leave it
option. Respondents have one avenue with which to donate their cadavers, the Illinois
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMVt Future research might explore how a specific
incentivize program compares to an unregulated market where individuals are able to
negotiate prices.
Finally, the model utilized in this research could alter the demand curve for organs
as shown in Figure 1 . The demand curve in Figure 1 depicts individuals in need of cadaver
organs and assumes perfect inelasticity in accordance with Adams (1999) . The supply
curve depicts the increase in supply due to an increase in price. Note the supply curve
does not begin at the graph's origin due to the presence of altruistic donors. This paper will
investigate the effectiveness of the $30 dollar incentive and if the incentive could help in
moving towards market equilibrium.
IV.

Data

Two separate surveys were administered to students at Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU )
and to residents of Bloomington IL during the fall of 2014 and the spring of 2015 to collect
the data used in this study. The IWU survey was administered online while the Bloomington
IL resident survey was administered through random digit dialing techniques to Bloomington

3 A difference exists between the cost of a cadaver organ and a living organ. To donate a living organ

there are higher opportunity costs; having to take time off of work, risk, and health concerns. These
issues are irrelevant for cadaver organ donors and therefore may assist in explaining why the price of a
cadaver organ is less than a living organ. Future research could expand on this topic.

4 These alterations to a market place, are areas for future research
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Figure 1
Theoretical Model
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D-Demand for Organs
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Altruistic
Donors

Incentivized
Donors

residents. Overall, 498 participants completed either the phone or online surve/. The
methods utilized in this research are similar to that employed by Adams's (1999) with the
difference that it investigates monetary incentives as they relate to the supply of cadaver
organs and the effectiveness of a take-it or leave-it mechanism.
To begin, respondents were grouped based on specific answers during the survey.
First, respondents were asked if they were cadaver organ donors. Depending on their
response, respondents from both subsets were asked different questions. Residents of
Bloomington who were cadaver organs were asked:
Seeing how you are already an organ donor would you still agree to be an
organ donor even if the Illinois DMV offered non-organ donors payment of
$30 in order to entice them into donation?6

5 Only students could complete the online survey

6 Note that the respondents from the fall (online) survey were not asked this question
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This question is an attempt to address Titmuss's (1971) concern that a
monetary and altruistic market cannot co-exist. If a significant number of
respondents indicate they would cease being organ donors, this supports the claim
that the two markets cannot coexist.
Non-organ donors were asked the following question:
In Illinois, individuals have to pay a $30 fee when they get or renew their
driver's license. With this in mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor
Vehicles was to waive your fee the next time you went to renew or get
your license, only if you agreed to be an organ donor, would you then
become an organ donor to cancel the $30 fee? 7

This question investigates the effectiveness of a small incentive to induce cadaver
organ donation. Complete reproductions of both surveys can be found in Appendix A.
A. Summary Data

Data collected from the two experimental treatments is summarized based on
demographic information and whether the respondent were already organ donors as shown
in Table 1. Among the 193 males in the study 65.8% (127) were already organ donors,
while 28.60% (50) were not. Among 295 women, 66.10% (195) were already organ donors,
while 23.72% (70) were not. Regarding religion, of the 215 Protestants 74.9% (161) were
organ donors, of the 106 Catholics 63.20% (67) were organ donors, and of 158 Other NonChristians 57.59% (91) were already organ donors.

7

Note the respondents from the fall survey were asked instead, In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a
$30 fee when they get their driver's license. With this in mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles
was to waive your fee, only if you became an organ donor, would you then become an organ donor to cancel the

$30 fee? The questions are essentially identical except for minor changes in the syntax.
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Table 1
Organ Donors Among Different Demographics
Number (Total 498)
Cadaver Organ Donor?
Total (193)
Men
127
Yes
50
No
Total (295)
Women
195
Yes
70
No
Total (10G)
Catholics
67
Yes
35
No
Total (215)
Protestants
161
Yes
40
No
Total (158)
Other Non-Christian
91
Yes
40
No

Gender

Religion

Percentage
65.8%
28.60%
66.10%
23.72%

-

63.20%
33.00%

-

74.9%
18.6%
57.59%
25.31%

V. Significance Tests

Before testing if significant differences exist amongst the subsets in likelihood of
being an organ donor, the data is first compared against DMV information on cadaver organ
donors to ensure a representative sample. A two sample Z-statistic is calculated to test the
null hypothesis that the difference between the two proportions is statistically insignificant
(equal to zero). The results of this test can be found in Table 2 showing that the sample is
representative of the general population.

Population

Table 2
Testing the significant between samples
Proportion of Cadaver Donors

Results

Bloomington

64.05%

z-value-0.945

Collected Sample

66.06%

p-value=0.1723

Testing the significant between gender
Gender

Proportion of Cadaver Donors

Results

Men

65.80%

z-value=0.07

Women

66.10%

p-value=0.472

13

As is also shown in Table 1 differences do exist across gender in regards to organ
donation, however using a two sample Z-statistic it can be concluded that the differences
are insignificant as displayed in Table 2 .
The same procedure is utilized to discern i f a significant difference exists among
religions. Here it is found that differences do exist based on religious affiliation as
Protestants are more likely to be organ donors relative to Catholics and to other nonChristian religions. Between Catholics and Other non-Christian religions no statistical
difference is found. These results are displayed in Table 3.

����Et;�;;:m-----���---------�

I
r

and
z-value=3.52
probability=O.Ooo***

���
probability=O.179

***

at the 99% Confidence Interval Level

In looking at how the $30 fee waiver incentivizes a change in behavior Table 4
summarizes responses by gender and religion. According to Table 4, both men and women
are responsive to the $30 incentive but it appears men are more responsive than women.
When examining different religions, it appears Catholics, Protestants, and the "Other
Non-Christians" are enticed by the $30 incentive with more opting to become cadaver organ
donors. Surprisingly, Catholics are likely to respond to the incentive, which contradicts
earlier assertions made in the literature
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Table 4
Men and Women currently not Organ Donors�lntroduced to Monetary Incentive

Gender

Total No's (Per
Gender)

Response to $30 Incentive
Become Organ
Remain No
Donors

Men
Women
Religion

50
70
Total No's (Per
Religion)
35
40
40

62% (31)
58.57% (41)
Become Organ
Donors
68.57%(24)
60.00% (24)
55% (22)

Catholic
Protestant
Other Non-Christian

38% (19)
41.43% (29)
Remain No
31.42% (11)
40.00% (16)
45% (18)

In testing for differences in groups a Z-statistic is calculated to test if the $30
incentive has a significant impact amongst different subsets Table 5 provides data
indicating whether the $30 incentive had a significant impact for the population as a whole
and individual subsets. Column 1 in Table 5 indicates which subset is studied and the
number in parentheses indicates the total number in the subset. Column 2 presents the
total number of individuals from the subsets who are organ donors before the introduction of
the $30 incentive. Column 3 contains the new percentage of individuals who become an
organ donor due to the introduction of the $30 incentive while column 4 tests to see if the
difference between the original and new proportion is significant.
The results of the Z-statistic displays that the $30 dollar incentive is significant at the
1% level meaning it can increase the proportion of cadaver organ donors. Although the
data set is cross-sectional and utilizes a small number of cases, the finding gives positive
empirical evidence that a minor incentive can increase the proportion of organ donors
among a population.

15

Table 5
Is the $30 Incentive Significant for Each Subset?
Column 1
Population

Column 2
Original
Yes Before
Incentive

Total

66.06%

(498)

329

Men

65.80%

(193)

127

Women

66.10%

(295)

195

Protestants

74.88%

(215)

161

Catholics

63.21%

185-161+
24
85.85%

(106)
"Other NonChristian"
(158)

67
57.59%

91-67+24
84.78%%

Column 4
Significance
?
(One Sample z-test)

Column 3
New
Number
of Yes
because
$30
incentive
80.52%

z-statistic-6.814
Probability=O.OO'"

401=329+
72
81.87%

z-statistic-4.71
Probability=O.OO'"

158-1127
+31
80.00%

z-statistic-5.04
Probability=O.OO'"
-

236-195+
41
86.05%

-

z-statistic-3.78
Probabilitv=O.OO'"

z-statistic-4.83
Probability=O.OO'"

-

z-statistic-6.92
Probabilitv=O.OO'"

113-91+2
2
The number in the parentheses indicates what total the percentage is calculated from.
'Significant at the 90% Confidence Interval, "Significant at the 95% Confidence Interval,
Level
91

•••

Significant at the 99%

In breaking down the sample population into sub-groups it is found each subset is
enticed by the $30 incentive. This suggests that willingness to accept the $30 incentive is
not limited by gender or religiosity. This finding differs from previous literature that religious
groups have different attitudes towards cadaver organ donation.
Table 6 attempts to address Titmuss concern that a significant reduction in altruistic
donors will occur because of the monetary incentive. These results suggest that when
examining the population as a whole, the introduction of the monetary market does deplete
altruistic donations. The same holds true when analyzing each of the different subsets

16

Table 6
Will introduction of monetary market cause altruistic donors to deplete?
Column 1
Column 2
Column 3
Column 4
Population
Original
Loss of
Significance
?
Yesaltruistic
Before
donors
(One Sample z-test)
Market
Total
100%
86.61%
z-statistic-19.85
Probability=O.OO***
254
220-254(254)
34
Men
100%
86.14%
z-statistic-12.98
Probabilitv=O.OO***
(101)
101
87-101-14
Women
100%
87.00%
z-statistic-14.57
Probability=O.OO***
146
(146)
127-14619
Protestants
100%
88.55%
z-statistic=12.02
Probabilitv=O.OO***
131
116-131(131)
15
100%
Catholics
93.18%
z-statistic-3.88
Probability=O.OO***
44
41-44-3
(44)
100%
"Other Non81.94%
z-statistic=14.55
Christian"
Probability=O.OO'"
59-72-13
72
72
The number in the parentheses indicates what total the percentage is calculated from.
*Significant at the 90% Confidence Interval, *'Significant at the 95% Confidence Interval, **. Significant at the 99%
Level
-

-

-

However, these findings must be taken with a degree of caution. While administering the
phone banking survey, there was some confusion amongst respondents if they themselves
would need to partake in the monetary market. In short, some respondents may have
indicated "no" to remaining organ donors because they themselves believed they would
have to take the monetary incentive, when instead the question itself was meant to entice
non-organ donors. Future endeavors should explore if the findings of this paper are
accurate portrayals or a result a survey design flaw.
VI. Multivariate Empirical Model

A multivariate empirical model is estimated to explore if the willingness to accept the
$30 incentive is impacted by socio-demographic factors, while also examining if willingness
17

to remain an organ donor is impacted by the same demographics. Table 7 provides
information regarding the variables used to estimate the regression equationsB•

Variable
Become an organ donor
because of $30 incentive

Willingness to remain an
organ donor

Student
Catholic
White
Protestant
Knowledge of Someone
on Dialysis
Male
Age

(YES_ACCEPTlNG_$30)

Table 7
Information regarding Regressions
Definition
Code
Type
1-Yes, becomes organ
If the respondent would become an
Dependent
organ donor because of the $30
donor
O=No, does not become
incentive.
an organ donor
1-Yes Stay an organ
Dependent
donor
O=No, does not stay an
orQan donor
1-Student
Indicated if the respondent was a
Independent
O=Non-Student
student
1-Catholic
Examines if the respondent is Catholic
Independent
O=Other
1-Caucasian
Independent
Indicates if the respondent is Caucasian
O=Other
1-Protestant
Indicates if the respondent is a
Independent
O=Other
Protestant
Indicates if the person knows someone
1-Know Someone on
Independent
on kidney dialysis
kidney dialysis
O=Other
1-Respondent is Male
Indicates if the respondent is male
Independent
O=Other
Gives the ape of the respondent
Continuous Variable
Independent

=

Regression One
C+{31(WHITE) + {32(STUDENT) + {33(CATHOLlC) + {34(PROTESTANT) + e

The results from Regression One are located in Table 8. When the independent
variables are observed in concert, only the STUDENT variable is significant. Overall, being
a student increases the likelihood of accepting the $30 incentive. This means that
participants who were students were more likely to accept the $30 incentive relative to
nonstudents. The independent variables WHITE, CATHOLIC, and PROTESTANT are all
insignificant indicating that these descriptors do not impact the decision to be an organ
donor among those willing to accept the $30 incentive to be an organ donor. Again, this
finding has positive implications for policy ramifications. This is additional evidence that the

8 Since the dependent measurement, is dichotomous

in nature a binary logistic regression is utilized.
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$30 incentive would not be limited by gender or religiosity, an idea which is elaborated in
the conclusions.
Table 8
Binary Logistic Regression
(Willingness to Accept $30 Incentive)
C
Probability
White
Probability
Student
Probability
Catholic
Probability
Protestant
Probability
Cox & Snell R Square

-0.746
(0.117)
0.617
(0.180)
0.716
(0.074)*
0.728
(0.136)
0.393
(0.399)
0.066

121
N
*Significant at the 90% Confidence Interval Level,**Significant at the 95% Confidence
Interval Level, *** Significant at the 99% Confidence Interval Level

The second regression investigates if willingness to remain an organ donor after the
introduction of the monetary incentive is impacted by demographic characteristics9. For
instance, perhaps those who practice a religion will cease to be organ donors after the
introduction of the market.
Regression TWO
(Willingness_To_Remain_An_Organ_Donor) = C+(31(WHITE) + (32(KNOW_SOMEONE_ON_DIALYS/S)
+ (33(AGE) + (34(CA THOLlC) + (35(PROTESTANT) + (34(MALE) + e

Overall, it appears knowledge of someone on kidney dialysis makes an individual
less likely to remain an organ donor after the introduction of the market. However, being
Catholic or Protestant makes an individual more likely to remain an organ donor after the
introduction of the market, which directly contradicts previous theories. A significant finding
is that race, religion, and age does not impact ones willingness to remain an organ donor after
the implementation of the monetary incentive. Recall, there are concerns regarding this
questions validity.
9 This regression only utilized

data which was collected from the spring.
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Table 9
Binary Logistic Regression
(Willingness to Remain and Organ Donor)
C

1.611

Probabifity

(O.044)*'

White

0.527

Probabifity

(0.283)

Know Someone on
Dialysis

-0.849

Probability

(0.032)**

Age

-0.010

Probabifity

(0.351)

Catholic

1.499**

Probabifity

0.030

Protestant

0.756*

Probability

0.065

Male

0.092

Probability

0.818

Cox & Snell R Square
N

0.061
254

*Significant at the 90% Confidence Interval Level,**Significant at the 95% Confidence
Interval Level, *** Significant at the 99% Confidence Interval Level

Evidence that the data to this question might be subject to substantial noise is the finding
that knowing someone on kidney dialysis will make an individual less likely to remain an organ
donor. Theoretically, if one knows someone suffering on kidney dialysis, why would they be
more likely to cease being organ donor due to a government intervention to remove the organ
shortage? Further research is necessary to truly understand this result from this survey
question.
VII. Ethical Considerations

Returning to the two major objections to a monetary incentive program (the
exploitation and religious freedom objections) this paper seeks to shed some light on these
concerns in view of the collected data. Although this is not an exhaustive list, addressing
these objections adds validity in utilizing the aforementioned policy as an approach to close
the gap in the observed organ shortage. As these two concerns are considered it is
important to highlight the differences in living and cadaver organ donation.
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A. The Exploitation Objection

The first and most recurrent objection is the exploitation objection or the concern "the
poor would become the walking organ banks of the well-to-do" (Satel, 2008). In addressing
this objection, differentiate between the terms equality and exploitation. As Lawlor (2011)
accounts, the term explOitation is often confused with equality.
"We can, for example, object that the rich can buy organs while the poor
cannot, without having this having anything to do with exploitation, or without
claiming that those who do buy organs are exploiting the poor, or anyone
else. If I claim that it is unfair and unjust that the rich can buy health care not
available to the poor I am complaining about inequality" (Lawlor, 252, 2011).
Essentially, the objection of equality claims the rich have the financial means to buy
organs but the poor cannot afford to do so. This concern of equality is not applicable to the
suggested policy because a free-market is not developed. The DMV simply waives the
driver's license fee for the individual, enticing them into donation. Organs are still
transplanted on a need-be basis. However, a sincere objection can be made that the poor
are more likely to participate in the program, as opposed to the wealthy. First, this research
analyzed if willingness to accept the $30 incentive was related to economic standing finding
that income does not explain why individuals choose to become organ donors. For sake of
discussion, suggest the findings are inadequate. Perhaps economically disadvantaged
individuals are more likely to accept the incentive compared to the wealthier. Greasley
(2012) coins the term "defected consent," explaining why the use of monetary incentives, in
a living organ donation context causes exploitation stating:
"The problem of exploitation in this context is often referred to as an issue of
'defective consent' on the part of the vendor, whose poverty and desperation
precludes him from making a 'truly autonomous' choice to exchange his
organ for money" (Greasley, 52, 2012).
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It can be inferred that the dire circumstances of the poor prevent the individual from
reaching a rational, independent decision. However, the aforementioned was in regards to
living donation in which payment to the supplier surpasses thousands of dollars. The
suggested policy in this research utilizes a $30 incentive to induce people to become
cadaver organ donors, not living organ donors. If an individual has strong convictions
against donation, would $30 truly suppress autonomy?
In addition, Greasley (2012) accounts that exploitation requires the party surrender
something of use, which can include items like sex, labor, organs, etc. However, in the
case of cadaver donation, the vendor never forgoes a useable good. All organs remain
intact and only after the demise of the individual are transplantable organs removed in a
proper manner. Since organs have no use to a deceased body the individual never
surrenders a useable good and is therefore incapable of being exploited.
There are additional problems with the exploitation objection. As Lawlor (2011)
accounts, the argument assumes that the person donating the organ (in the context of living
donation), is the exploited party. However, this perception is incomplete from examining the
following passage,
"Mark Schofield has waited for more than four years for the kidney transplant
which would save his life and let him see his children grow up. But after finally
losing patience, he flew to the Philippines with 40,000 in savings ready to buy
a new organ from a living donor. The 43-year-old-hopes to find a poverty
stricken Filipino desperate enough to sell him a kidney" (Lawlor, 252).
In the aforementioned, it is unclear which party is exploited. Common belief asserts
the Filipino as the exploited party, but as Lawlor accounts exploitation derives from the
individual possessing the greatest amount of bargaining power. For instance, if Mr.
Schofield has ten economically disadvantaged Filipinos willing to sell their kidneys, he is in
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position to exploit. However, if only one supplier exists, Mr. Schofield, in a direr situation, is
the exploited party.
Essentially, the practice of selling organs is not inherently exploitative, but it is the
balance of power which proliferates the possibility. Again, the aforementioned only holds
true in a free-market. This policy is unique because it recommends monetary compensation
for cadaver organs and the DMV utilizes an incentive structure to entice cadaver organ
donation. Organs are useless to an individual upon their demise, making it impossible to
exploit a cadaver organ donor.
B. Religious Freedom Objection

The second objection is the religious freedom objection. A person from a faith which
disapproves of organ donation might claim the suggested policy is unlawful and
discriminates against their religion since, for religious reasons, they are not allowed to
partake in the $30 program. Currently, for many government programs in the United States,
exclusion is common practice. For instance, Jehovah Witnesses are not allowed to enlist in
a military branch, yet the govemment provides a military to fulfil its constitutional obligation
to provide for the common defense. More importantly, the army is providing financial
resources to individuals which can reach thousands of dollars. For instance, private
soldiers earn over $18,000 per year and on advancement could earn more than $50,000
per year. It therefore seems inconsistent to accept one government program but to deny
the other, especially when the latter provides greater financial support.
In addition, the Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) which was passed in 1993
provides a strict scrutiny test, known as the sherbert test, to ensure the government does
not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the state has public interest
in doing so. Initially, the language of the act suggests the state cannot infringe on the
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practice of religion. The policy suggested does not tax or fine a religion; it simply offers a
reward for donation. An individual is free to practice their religion, with no additional penalty
or burden since the driver's license fee was already in place.
The RFRA also provides exceptions for the state to invoke a policy even if it was to
infringe on an individual's religion. A policy must improve a government's interest, ideally
an interest which relates to a constitutional concern. Since the constitution states the
government has the authority to promote the general welfare, efforts to increase organ
donation falls within constitutional limits. If public concern is prevalent surrounding the
religious freedom objection, clauses can be written into the program to excuse members of
a certain faith. For instance, a clause might exclude all Jehovah Witnesses from having to
pay the $30, regardless if they agree to donate.
VIII. Conclusions and Policy Implications

This research began with the goal to empirically test if the wavier of a $30 driver
license fee could significantly increase the quantity of cadaver organ donors. Utilizing a
sample Z-statistic, it was discovered that the incentive structure could increase the quantity
of cadaver organ donors. In addition, this paper utilized binary logistic regressions to test if
certain demographics might influence individuals' willingness to accept the monetary
inventive. Uncovering that race, gender, age, religion, and income did not impact an
individual's willingness to accept the $30 incentive has strong policy ramifications. First,
finding an insignificant income variable suggest policy makers need not worry about the
exploitation of the poor. Second, since religiosity was also found to be insignificant, the
suggested policy would not need to be tailored for specific religions.
Third, utilizing this research 's finding with Thaler's (2008), the significant student
variable suggests that policy makers should direct their attention towards student
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populations and utilize the $30 incentive to encourage registering to be a cadaver organ
donor. Once enrolled, the students are unlikely to "opt-out" indicating the incentive need
only be used once per individual.
Future research should expand on this data with a sample that has more variety.
While the dataset is similar to the general populous of central Illinois this populous is not an
accurate representation of all citizens within the United States. It may be that different
states' residents behave differently to the monetary incentive. In addition, this paper
suggests exploring additional incentive based structures beyond the $30 incentive to
increase cadaver organ donation. For instance, changing the fee structure by groupings to
see if the elasticity of organ donor's changes by fee would allow for an investigation into
what is the optimal fee waiver needed to induce different groups into registering to be
cadaver organ donors.
This paper recognizes the on-going debate, concem, and reality of organ donation.
This $30 incentive is just one tool of many that should be investigated and possibly used to
increase the quantity of cadaver organ donors. Another day of the status quo is another 21
deaths due to the current shortage. This paper challenges the status quo and welcomes
others too in order to close the shortage gap of organs.
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Appendix
Survey for Honors Research
(Phone Survey Used in Spring)

and I am a student at Illinois
available? Hi my name is
Good Evening is
Wesleyan University (IWU). IWU is conducting research in regards to individuals' attitudes
towards organ donation and we would appreciate your input.
The purpose of this study is to examine if monetary incentives could be utilized to increase the
supply of cadaver organs.
The length of time you will be involved with this study is approximately 5 minutes, and you will
be asked to complete a phone survey.
The records of this study will be kept private and your participation is voluntary. You have the
right to refuse to participate or to withdraw at any time without penalty.
Step 1

1.

Do you wish to participate in the survey
1.1.
Yes (Continue on to Step 2)
No (If they answer "No" the survey is over and say
1 .2.

Thank you

for your time)

Step 2-Demographics

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the survey. I will now ask some demographic questions.
1.
What year were you born? Enter year (Ex. 1989)
2.
What race would you say you a member of? (Make sure you list the choices)
2.1.
African American/African/Black/Caribbean
2.2.
Asian/Pacific Islander
2.3.
Caucasian (Non Hispanic)
2.4.
Hispanic/Latino
Native American
2.5.
2.6.
Prefer not to answer
3.
Are you Married?
Yes
3.1.
3.2.
No
Prefer Not to Answer
3.3.
4.
Are you male, female, or prefer not to answer? (If you can tell by their voice, no
reason to ask this question)
4.1.
Male
4.2.
Female
Prefer not to answer/ Do not know
4.3.
5.
Including yourself, how many people live in your household?
5.1.
Write down the numbe�
6.
If any, which organized religion are you a member of?
_
_
_
-

_
_
_
-
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6. 1 .
6.2.
6.3.
6.4.
6.5.
6.6.
6.7.
6.B.

Protestant/Other Christian
Catholic
Mormon
Jewish
Islam
Other non-Christian religion
Prefer not to answer
Not Applicable

Step 3-Questions Regarding Organ Donation

Thank you for completing the first part of the survey, now I would like to get your opinion
regarding organ donation.
1.

2.

3.

Do you know of a friend or relative who is on kidney dialysis?
1.1.
Yes
1 .2.
No
1.3.
Prefer Not to Answer
Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever been an organ donor?
2.1.
Yes
2.2.
No
2.3.
Prefer Not to Answer
Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever been a recipient of donor
organs?
3. 1 .
Yes
3.2.
No
3.3.
Prefer Not to Answer

Step 4- You are almost done and this is the final section of the survey. As you may know, there
is an enormous need for organ donors throughout the United States. In 2012, more than 6,500
people died waiting for an organ transplant, and over a thousand more suffer on waiting lists.
Increasing cadaver organ donation is one way to limit this shortage.
Now I would like to ask you some questions in regards to cadaver organ donation.
1. Do you have an Illinois driver's license?
1.1
Yes
No
1.2
Prefer Not to Answer/Do not Know
1.3
2. Are you already an organ donor? (If they answer "no" or "prefer not to
got to # 3. If they answer "yes" go to question #4.)
2.1
Yes
2.2
No
2.3
Prefer Not to Answer

answer"
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3. In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30 fee when they get or renew their driver's
license. With this in mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles was to waive your fee the
next time you went to renew or get your licence, only if you agreed to be a cadaver organ donor,
would you then become one to cancel the $30 fee?
Yes
3.4.
3.5.
No
3.6.
Prefer Not to Answer
4.
Seeing how you are already an organ donor would still agree to be an organ
donor even if the Illinois DMV offered non-organ donors payment of $30 in order
to entice them into donation?
4.1.
Yes
4.2.
No
4.3.
Do not know
4.4.
Prefer not to answer
5.
Last question, what would you say is your household's annual income?
5.1.
Below 10,000
5.2.
10,000 to 40,000
40,000 to 80,000
5.3.
5.4.
80,000 to 120,000
5.5.
Above 120,000
Prefer not to answer
5.6.
Thank you for completing the survey. We appreciate your input and time. If you have questions,
you may contact the researcher(s) via email at dtruesda@iwu.edu. If you have questions or
concerns regarding this study and would like to speak with someone other than the
researcher(s), you may contact Dr. Leah Nillas, Institutional Review Board Chair, Illinois
Wesleyan University, at 309-556-3437, Inilas@iwu.edu.
Survey for Honors Research
(Online Survey Used in Fall)
Monetary Market for Organ Donation
You are invited to be a participant in a research study about monetary m a rkets for organs. You were
selected as a possible participant because you are e n rolled at Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU). We ask
that you read this document and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.
The study is being conducted by Mr. Daniel Truesdale a student at IWU and Professor Craig Broadbent
of Illinois Wesleyan U niversity.
The purpose of this study is to examine if monetary incentives could be utilized to increase the supply of
cadaver orga ns.
The length of time you will be involved with this study is approximately 30 minutes, you will be asked to
complete a survey.
If you agree to participate, we will ask you to complete a list of q u estions from an online survey.
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The records of this study will be kept private. The data will be anonymous and only Professor Broadbent
and Mr. Truesdale will have access to the data. Any sort of report that is published or presentation that
is given, will not include any individual specific information.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect
your
current or future relations with Illinois Wesleyan University or any of its representatives. You have the
right to
refuse to participate or to withdraw at any time without penalty or loss of benefits
At this time, you may ask any questions you have about this study or about the informed consent
process. If you
have questions later, you may contact the researcher(s) at (309) 556-3711, dtruesda@iwu.edu.
If you have questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to speak with someone other than
the
researcher(s), you may contact Dr. Brian Brennan, I nstitutional Review Board Chair, Illinois Wesleyan
University, at 309-556-3972, bbrenna1@iwu.edu.
If you would like a copy of this form for your records please contact dtruesda@iwu.edu and a form will
be em ailed to you.
I have read and understood the above explanations, and my questions have been addressed. The
information that I
provide will be used for research purposes only. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that
I may
withdraw anytime without penalty. If I have any concerns about my experience in this study (e.g., that I
was
treated unfairly or felt unnecessarily threatened), I may contact the researchers or the Chair of the IWU
Institutional Review Board regarding my concerns. I voluntarily consent to participate in this research
study. (By clicking "Yes" and advancing to next page, you agree to the study).
Do you wish to participate in the online survey?
o
o

r
r

Yes
No

Information on Organ Donation
There is an enormous need for organ donors throughout the United States. In 2012, more than 6,500
people died waiting for an organ transplant. How Cadaver Organ Donation Works: All lifesaving efforts
are made to save a person's life without regard to their status as a n organ/tissue donor. It is only after
these efforts have failed and someone is declared dead that recovery efforts begin. The staff at the
hospital, for which the individual is deceased, is not involved with the recovery process and does not
have access to the Secretary of State Organ/Tissue Donor Registry. When death occurs or is imminent,
the hospital staff contacts the organ procurement organization (OPO) to report the death. The OPO
sends clinical staff to the hospital if it is likely that donation is possible. The OPO contacts the Secretary
of State's donor registry hotline to find out if the person is listed in the registry. If the person is in the

31

registry, the trained OPO staff will work with the family, explaining the process, gathering information
and provide support. If he/she is not in the registry, family will be educated about the process and asked
for consent to donate. Each potential donor is evaluated to see what organs/tissue can be recovered for
transplantation. The number of organs/tissue recovered varies from person to person. The United
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) manages the list of patients waiting for transplants. A computer
program matches donor organs with recipients based on certain matching criteria such as blood and
tissue type, height and weight, as well as how sick the patient is, how long they have been waiting and
distance from donor to patient. About 75 percent of all organs go to local patients. Recovery is a surgical
procedure where the donor is treated with dignity and respect, and the body restored to allow for a n
open-casket visitation. A l l funeral and burial or cremation options may take place after donation. I n
order t o register a s a n organ donor in Illinois, you must b e a t least 18 years old. * * If you are younger
than 18 years old, your parents, next of kin, or legal guardians have the responsibility of making the
decision about organ donation. When a n individual registers, the organ donor registry will carry out
their wish to donate your organs and tissues upon your death. The individual's family will NOT have to
pay any amount for the removal of your organs. Although everyone is eligible for organ donation
(regardless of age, race, or medical history), medical professionals make determinations whether the
organs are suitable for transplant once a n organ donor has deceased. Below is a list ofthe top Myths
regarding organ donation: Doctors don't work with the same urgency to save an individual's life if they
know their an organ donor: Many people are concerned that if they sign up to be an organ donor, they
won't get the same level of care should they end up in a life or death situation. However, this is not true.
Your doctor is obligated to have one singular aim: to save your life. If you are a registered donor, a
doctor might declare you dead before it's appropriate: This is a common myth that scares many people
out of registering to donate. However, the o pposite is actually true. Organ donors are given more tests
to determine official death than those patients who haven't agreed to organ donation. Doctors will take
all of your organs, even if you only want to donate one: You can specify which organs you are willing to
donate. Only the organ(s) you identify will be donated. Organs are sold on the black market: There are
many urban legends involving frightening tales of organs being stolen and sold for profit. The process of
donation is so complex and medically involved that this is not viable in the U.S. A transplant necessitates
all of the following: Highly trained doctors. Modern healthcare facilities. Matching of donors to
recipients. Other medical support. We would like to ask a few questions about you before we proceed
to questions about organ donation.
All_Questions
Year you were born
Race
0
0
0
0
0

n
n
r
r
r

African America n/African/Black/Caribbea n
Asian/Pacific Islander
Caucasian (Non Hispanic)
Hispanic/Latino
Native American
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o

Prefer not to answer

Are you married?
0
0
0

Gender
0
0

o

r

r,
r

r
r
r

Yes
No
Prefer not to answer

Male
Female
Prefer not to answer

How many people, besides yourself, live in your household?

o

r

O

o

1

o

2

o

3

o

4

o

5

o

More than 5

What is your personal aggregate annual income?
'Include income from a l l external factors: (Parents, Guardians, Scholarships, Part-Time Job, etc.)
0
0
0
0
0

o

r
r
r
r
r
r

Less than $10,000
$10,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000-$99,999
$100,000-$249,000
$250,000 or more

Are you a member of an organized religion?
0
0
0

C
r

r,

Yes
No
Prefer not to answer

If yes, which organized religion are you a member of?

o
o

r

Protestant/Other Christian
Catholic
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0
0
0
0
0
o

r
r
r
r
r
r

Mormon
Jewish
Muslim
Other non-Christian religion
Prefer not to answer
Not Applicable

Organ Donation Questions
Do you know of a friend or relative who is on dialysis?
0
0
0

r
r
r

Yes
No
Prefer not to answer

Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever been a organ donor?
o

r

Yes

o

No

o

Prefer not to answer

Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever been a recipient of donor organs?
o
o
o

r
r
r

Yes
No
Prefer not to answer

Would you be offended by the purchase and sale of cadaver organs, even if such transaction
saved lives?
0
0
0

r

r
r

Yes
No
Do not know

Would you be offended by a government program which would allow your organs to be
removed at death without your explicit permission?
o

r

Yes

o

No

o

Do not know

If yes, would you still be offended by a governmental policy which would allow your organs to
be removed at death without your explicit permission, even if you could prevent such removal
by prefiling, prior to your death, a statement denying such permission?
o

r

Yes
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o
o

r

No
Do not know

Which organs would you be willing to donate after you are deceased?
'Select "All" if you would donate a l l your organs
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

r
r
r
r
r
r

r

Heart
Lungs
Liver
Pancreas
Kidneys
Small Intestines
All

Which organs would you not be willing to donate after you are deceased?
'Select "All" if you would not donate any of your organs
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

r
r
r
r
r
r
r

Heart
Lungs
Liver
Pancreas
Kidneys
Small I ntestines
All

Do you have a illinois driver's license?
0
0
0

r

r
r

Yes
No
Prefer not to answer

If yes to the last question, then the respondents followed this track.
Monetary Market for Organ Donation
Illinois Questions
If yes, do you know you can become a cadaveric organ donor through your driver's license by
joining the First-Person Consent Organ/Tissue Donor Registry by submitting a form online, by
calling
o
o

1-800-210-2106 or by visiting your nearest Secretary of State facility.
r

r·

Yes
No
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Are you already a cadaveric organ donor?
'You can consult you Illinois Driver's License to verify if you are a cadaveric organ donor
0
0
0

r
r

r,

Yes
No
Do not know

If a nswered no or do not know, respondents were asked the following
Illinois Driver Incentive
In Illinois, persons

21-60 have to pay a $30 fee when they get their driver's license. With this in

mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles was to waive your fee, only if you became
an organ donor, would you then become an organ donor to cancel the
o
o
o

r
r
r

$30 fee?

Yes
No
Do not know

If answered yes, respondents were asked the following
Illinois Driver Incentive-For Donors
In Illinois, persons

21-60 have to pay a $30 fee when they get their driver's license. With this in

mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles was to waive your fee, only if you became
an organ donor, would you have been more enticed to become an organ donor in order to
cancel the
o
o
o

r
r
r

$30 fee?
Yes
No
Do not know
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